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Economic saving is an elaborate behavior in which
the goal of a reward in the future directs planning
and decision-making in the present. Here, we
measured neural activity while subjects formed sim-
ple economic saving strategies to accumulate re-
wards and then executed their strategies through
choice sequences of self-defined lengths. Before
the initiation of a choice sequence, prospective acti-
vations in the amygdala predicted subjects’ internal
saving plans and their value up to twominutes before
a saving goal was achieved. The valuation compo-
nent of this planning activity persisted during execu-
tion of the saving strategy and predicted subjects’
economic behavior across different tasks and testing
days. Functionally coupled amygdala and prefrontal
cortex activities encoded distinct planning compo-
nents that signaled the transition from saving strat-
egy formation to execution and reflected individual
differences in saving behavior. Our findings identify
candidate neural mechanisms for economic saving
in amygdala and prefrontal cortex and suggest a
novel planning function for the human amygdala in
directing strategic behavior toward self-determined
future rewards.
INTRODUCTION
Economic saving is anelaborate formofplannedbehavior charac-
terizedbydynamic,sequential choicesanda focusonself-defined
future reward [1, 2]. Successful saving is a key determinant of the
welfare of individuals and societies, which impacts entire eco-
nomic systems [3]. Theories in psychology, economics, and rein-
forcement learning have identified basic principles that underlie
planned behaviors involving rewards, such as economic saving:
a two-stage process that distinguishes the initial formation of a
behavioral strategy from its subsequent execution [1, 4], and a
valuation component that directs behavioral strategies toward
future rewards [5]. Here, we used fMRI to measure neural activity
in an economic reward-saving paradigm that modeled these
principles by separating the formation of a reward-based strategy
from its execution through sequential choices.3004 Current Biology 26, 3004–3013, November 21, 2016 ª 2016 Th
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativeBased on human lesion [6] and neuroimaging evidence and
single-cell recordings in monkeys [7], cognitive and action plan-
ning are traditionally associated with the frontal lobes. Other pro-
spective functions, such as episodic future thinking and spatial
navigation, are associated with medial temporal lobe structures
[8, 9]. However, much less is known about how the brain
mediates the influence of rewards on planning, despite their
crucial importance in directing strategy formation and execution
[1, 4, 5]. Studies using intertemporal choice paradigms have un-
covered human brain systems for the subjective valuation of de-
layed rewards [10–12]. More recent investigations of complex
multistep reinforcement learning showed that frontal-striatal
systems evaluate reward outcomes associated with externally
defined choice paths [13, 14]. These studies identified critical
neural components for prospective reward valuation but did
not address the key features of planned economic saving, which
involve the internal construction of a reward-directed strategy
and its subsequent execution through choice sequences of
self-defined length [1, 3].
Based on recent single-neuron evidence in non-human pri-
mates [15, 16], we hypothesized that in the current study the
human amygdala would show prospective activity related to
subjects’ economic saving strategies. Our hypothesis was
further motivated by evidence of amygdala functions in basic
reward valuation [17–22], processing of economic choice vari-
ables [23, 24], and decision-making [25–27]. We also expected
the involvement of prefrontal cortex areas, based on their
known valuation, cognitive control, and decision functions
[11, 28–32].
We designed a sequential economic saving paradigm in which
human subjects could form internal strategies to save flavored
liquid rewards that accumulated with interest; subjects later
executed their strategies through choice sequences of self-
defined lengths. Experimental manipulation of reward type and
interest rate elicited individual differences in saving strategies.
We used primary rewards because they elicit distinct subjective
preferences [20] and related activations in human reward and
decision systems [11, 19, 33], and because they induce ‘‘visceral
temptations’’ that promote variation in saving behavior, as
shown in previous experimental studies of real-life saving
decisions [3].
We observed prospective amygdala activations that predicted
subjects’ internal saving strategies up to two minutes before
their behavioral completion. This prospective activity encoded
two crucial planning components: the number of forthcoming
choice steps implied by the current saving strategy, and theire Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Figure 1. Economic Saving Task and
Behavior
(A) Subjects planned and performed choice se-
quences of self-defined lengths to save different
types of liquid reward that accumulated according
to a given interest rate. Each sequence was defined
by a combination of offered reward type (high-fat
versus low-fat drink) and interest rate (high versus
low), constituting a two-by-two factorial design. The
task allowed subjects to plan their behavior up to
2min in advance (up to 10 consecutive save choices
with 13 s cycle time, following the 13 s planning
phase). Randomized left-right positions of the save
and spend cues on each trial precluded planning of
action sequences.
(B) Example saving sequence in which the subject
spent on the eighth trial.
(C) Experimental conditions and pre-trained cues.
(D) Saving behavior in a representative subject. Bars
show relative frequencies with which the subject
produced different choice sequences. Green curves
show reward magnitude increases over sequential
save choices.
(E)Savingbehavioracrosssubjects.Thegraphshows
saving index (based on mean sequence lengths) for
individual subjects (gray) and mean across subjects
(black). Subjects saved longer (higher saving index)
when interest and fat content were high.
(F) Saving behavior modeled by subjective values. The graph shows a logistic regression of trial-by-trial save-spend choices on current sequence value (i.e., the
value associated with spending on the current trial, derived from choice frequencies [D]) and save value (i.e., the average value of spending on any remaining trial
of that sequence) (both p < 0.001, t test; current sequence value; t(23) = 9.64; save value t(23) = 4.55). Error bars represent SEM.
See also Figures S1–S3.subjective evaluation. Amygdala planning activity was function-
ally coupled to specific prefrontal areas that encoded distinct
planning components and reflected individual differences in
strategy formation and saving performance. These findings sug-
gest a previously unrecognized planning function for the human
amygdala and identify neural components for simple economic
saving strategies in functionally coupled amygdala-prefrontal
reward circuits.
RESULTS
Economic Saving Task
Healthy volunteers (n = 24) performed choice sequences of self-
defined lengths to save (accumulate) primary rewards (flavored
dairy drinks) before choosing to spend (consume) the accumu-
lated rewards (Figures 1A–1C). A sequence began with the plan-
ning phase (Figures 1A and 1B), in which pre-trained cues
signaled current interest rate and reward type (Figure 1C), allow-
ing subjects to form an internal saving strategy toward a
specific reward goal. Subjects then entered the choice phase,
in which they progressed toward their goal bymaking sequential,
trial-by-trial save versus spend choices. Following a spend
choice, computer-controlled pumps delivered the saved reward.
Throughout each sequence, current trial position and saved
reward amount were not cued, requiring subjects to track
progress internally. Importantly, as learned in a training session,
subjects could not influence the occurrence of reward type and
interest rate conditions over consecutive sequences. This task
design allowed subjects to autonomously plan their behaviorwithin a saving sequence up to 2 min in advance (up to 10
consecutive save choices with 13 s cycle time, following the
13 s planning phase).
Saving Behavior and Subjective Value Model
Saving behavior, measured by observed choice sequence
lengths, depended on current reward type, current interest
rate, and their interaction (Figures 1D and 1E; all p < 0.005,
multiple regression). Subjects generally saved longer with higher
interest rates and with the high-fat reward type (Figure 1E).
Crucially, changes in reward type and interest rate produced
substantial variation in saving behavior, both between subjects
(Figure 1E, gray dots) and within subjects (Figure 1D; Figure S1),
which confirmed the importance of subjective preferences in the
present task.
As economic choices critically depend on the subjective
values individuals derive from the choice options, we estimated
the value of each saving sequence (‘‘sequence value’’) from
observed choice frequencies (see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures). These subjective values depended on final reward
amounts and current reward type but also on expenditure related
to sequence length. As higher reward amounts required longer
sequences (determined by current interest rate), the value of
the sequence was compromised by temporal delay and physical
effort. To capture these influences on value in a direct manner,
we followed the general notion of standard economic choice the-
ory and estimated subjective values from observed behavioral
choices. We assumed that a saving sequence had a higher
subjective value if the subject chose it more frequently. ValuesCurrent Biology 26, 3004–3013, November 21, 2016 3005
derived in this manner provided a suitable description of
the observed saving choices, as confirmed by logistic regres-
sion (Figure 1F; Figure S2A; across-subjects pseudo-R2 =
0.62 ± 0.02), out-of-sample validation (Figure S2A, inset), corre-
lation with stated saving intentions (R = 0.33, p < 0.001), and
correlation with subjects’ bids for the same reward in a separate,
auction-like mechanism (Becker-DeGroot-Marschak [BDM] [34];
R = 0.39, p < 0.001). Notably, subjective values provided a
better description of subjects’ choices than the objective factors
reward type and interest rate, or their interaction (Figure S2).
Response times were related to subjective values, differed
significantly between save and spend choice trials, and de-
pended on the forthcoming sequence length (Figure S2), consis-
tent with internally planned saving. Furthermore, while subjects
approximated objectively optimal decisions in the low-fat/low-
interest condition (maximizing rate of reward return, i.e., liquid
per trial), they deviated from optimality in other conditions, with
substantial inter-subject variation (Figure S3). This further sug-
gested that behavior was guided by subjective valuations of
factors reward type and interest rate. Behavior in the current
sequence did not depend on the length of the previous sequence
(p > 0.05, multiple regression), which confirmed that subjects
treated sequences as independent.
Taken together, the combination of reward and interest rate
that defined each choice sequence elicited subjective valuations
of that sequence, which guided saving behavior.
Prospective Amygdala Activity Related to Internal
Saving Strategies
Classically, the amygdala is associated with affective responses
to immediate sensory events [35, 36] rather than internally driven
behavioral strategies. Such cue reactivity is also a dominant
theme in current views of human amygdala function [37–40].
By contrast, recent neurophysiological investigations implicate
the amygdala in more complex, sequential decision-making
[15, 16]. We therefore investigated whether activity in the human
amygdala reflected the key strategy components that guided
subjects’ saving decisions.
Broadly contrasting neural activity in planning and choice
phases identified brain areas previously implicated in cognitive
control, decision-making, and motivation (Figure 2A; Table S1,
GLM1). However, our most striking finding was future-oriented
activity in the amygdala that occurred during the planning
phase, even before subjects initiated a saving sequence. This
‘‘planning activity’’ predicted the length of the forthcoming
choice sequence, up to 2 min before its completion (Figure 2B,
GLM1). It was not explained by simple cue responses or re-
ported saving intentions (Figure S4). Importantly, sequence
lengths were self-defined by the subjects, rather than instructed,
and only existed as an internal, mental representation during the
planning phase. In this sense, the observed correlation between
amygdala activity and sequence length suggested that amyg-
dala planning activity ‘‘predicted’’ subsequent behavior. Thus,
prospective amygdala activity reflected the length of the inter-
nally planned choice sequence, which defined the subjects’
behavioral saving strategy.
We observed a second form of prospective amygdala activity
that reflected subjects’ valuations of saving strategies, which is
crucial for directing planned behavior toward preferred reward3006 Current Biology 26, 3004–3013, November 21, 2016goals [1, 5]. Regressing activity on the subjective value of the
forthcoming saving sequence (sequence value derived from
observed choices) revealed a selective effect in the amygdala
(Figure 2C, GLM2), distinct from encoding of planned sequence
length (Figure 2D). Importantly, by varying the experimental fac-
tors reward type and interest rate, we partly decorrelated chosen
sequence lengths from associated values (Figures 1D and 1E;
Figure S1), which allowed detection of separate neural effects.
The prospective valuation activity encoded specifically the value
of the currently planned, forthcoming saving sequence, rather
than simply reflecting the average value of the condition cue (re-
gressor for mean sequence value of each condition; p = 0.28,
t(23) = 1.1). Thus, in addition to encoding planned sequence
length, prospective amygdala activity reflected the subjective
value of the current saving strategy.
We tested whether these amygdala planning signals predicted
behavior also in a different value elicitationmechanism.On sepa-
rate days, subjects placed bids in an auction-like mechanism
(BDM) to indicate their willingness to pay for the same rewards
and choice sequences as in the saving task (Figure 2E). Using
a multiple-regression approach, we dissected the amygdala’s
planning activity, measured in the saving task, by modeling its
two distinct planning signals that correlated with the behavioral
saving plan (sequence length) and its value (sequence value),
respectively. Only the activity component captured by the
sequence value regressor also predicted subjects’ BDM bids
in the separate task (Figure 2F). Thus, prospective amygdala
value signals predicted behavior in a different economic task,
suggesting a flexible economic valuation mechanism.
Further analysis investigated relationships between amygdala
activity and saving behavior across individual participants. A
psychometric-neurometric comparison identified matching sen-
sitivities between individuals’ neural and behavioral measures
associated with strategy choice: across individuals, the behav-
ioral influence of factors reward type and interest rate, which
determined the choice of saving strategy, matched the neural in-
fluence of these factors on amygdala activity (Figures 3A–3C). In
other words, individual differences in saving behavior were ex-
pressed in the integration of different strategic factors, and
amygdala planning activity reflected this integration. Consis-
tently, a model of amygdala planning activity that incorporated
these subjective integrations also predicted willingness-to-pay
bids elicited in a separate task (Figure 3D). Thus, amygdala plan-
ning activity correlated well with individual differences in saving
behavior.
Taken together, these data suggest that prospective amyg-
dala activity in the planning phase encoded two crucial compo-
nents of economic saving strategies [1, 2]: the number of
forthcoming choice steps that define the subject’s behavioral
saving strategy, and the subjective value that reflects the
strategy’s focus on reward.
Frontal Planning Activities and Functional Connectivity
in the Planning Phase
The observed involvement of human amygdala in economic
planning required comparisons to prefrontal cortex regions
with well-established roles in cognitive control and decision-
making [11, 28–32]. Similar to amygdala, the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
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Figure 2. Amygdala Planning Activity Reflects Economic Saving Strategies
(A) Stronger amygdala activity in the planning phase compared to the choice phase (cluster p values corrected for family-wise error across the whole brain; map
thresholded at p < 0.005, uncorrected for display purposes, extent thresholdR 10 voxels).
(B) Amygdala activity in the planning phase predicted the length of the forthcoming choice sequence (p < 0.05, small volume correction).
(C) Amygdala activity in the planning phase reflected sequence value, i.e., the subjective value of the forthcoming choice sequence (p < 0.05, small volume
correction). Sequence value was derived from observed choice frequencies for different saving sequences.
(D) Region-of-interest analysis. The graph shows a regression of amygdala activity on sequence length and sequence value. Both factors explained significant
variance (p < 0.05, random-effects multiple linear regression; sequence length t(23) = 2.43; sequence value t(23) = 2.45). Neural bs indicate mean regression
weights from fitting a multiple linear regression model containing both sequence length and value regressors to neural activity in each subject. Thin colored lines
indicate SEM across subjects. ‘‘Planning phase’’ indicates onset of planning phase (at 0 s); ‘‘first save’’ indicates onset of first save trial in sequence. The blue
shaded box indicates the analysis period at the expected delay of the hemodynamic response.
(E) Behavior in a separate economic task. Subjects (n = 22) performed an economic auction-like (Becker-DeGroot-Marschak [BDM]) task in which they placed
willingness-to-pay bids on the same rewards and choice sequences as in the saving experiment. The mean bids per condition are shown for each subject (gray
data points) and means across subjects (black).
(F) Amygdala planning activity, measured during the saving task, predicted willingness-to-pay bids in the auction-like task. Only the sequence value signal (green
bs, based on sequence value-correlated amygdala activity during the saving task) predicted willingness-to-pay bids (p < 0.05, random-effects multiple linear
regression; sequence value signal t(21) = 2.45).
See also Figures S4 and S5.were more active during the planning phase than during the
choice phase (Figure 4A, GLM1), and their activity predicted
the forthcoming number of choice steps (Figure 4B, GLM1).
However, neither area reflected the value of the planned saving
strategy (nor individual reward preferences; Figure S5). Thus,
these frontal areas partly resembled the amygdala by encoding
subjects’ behavioral saving strategies (sequence length), but
they did not encode initial strategy valuations (sequence value).
Because DLPFC activity is involved in behavioral intentions
and information maintenance [41], we tested whether it encoded
subjects’ saving intentions in addition to behaviorally executed
plans. In the planning phase, DLPFC activity also correlated
with subjects’ initially stated willingness to save (WTS; Fig-
ure 4C), which suggested joint encoding of intended and
executed saving strategies. Reported and executed strategies
often corresponded, but subjects also frequently deviated from
their stated intentions, which allowed detection of separate neu-
ral effects (Figure S2D). These deviations were not random but
were partly explained by a combination of objective task factors,subjective valuations, and planning activity in DLPFC (but not
ACC or amygdala; Figure S2F). Consistent with these results,
discrepant DLPFC coding strengths for stated and executed
strategies were related to subjects’ behavioral deviations from
stated strategies (Figure 4D).
Frontal cortex planning activities not only resembled amyg-
dala planning activity, they were also functionally coupled to it
(Figure 4E; Table S5; Supplemental Experimental Procedures
GLM PPI 1-3). Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis
in the planning phase with amygdala as seed region identified
functional connectivity with ACC. This connection depended
on reward type in the current sequence, with enhanced amyg-
dala-ACC connectivity for the typically preferred high-fat re-
wards compared to low-fat rewards. We found similar connec-
tivity between ACC and another region with known decision
functions, the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) [10, 11, 28, 30,
31], with enhanced connectivity for high interest rates, which
overall elicited longer saving sequences. The strengths of these
two functional connections—reward-dependent amygdala-ACCCurrent Biology 26, 3004–3013, November 21, 2016 3007
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Figure 3. Across-Subject Relation between Amygdala Planning Activity and Individual Differences in Saving Strategy
(A) Amygdala region of interest, defined in unbiased manner by leave-one-out method.
(B) Illustration of analysis approach: regression of observed sequence lengths on factors reward type and interest rate resulted in subject-specific behavioral bs; a
corresponding regression of amygdala activity during the planning phase (extracted from amygdala region of interest) resulted in subject-specific neural bs.
Behavioral (left) and neural (right) bs for reward type (‘‘reward b,’’ reflecting regression coefficients for high-fat versus low-fat content) are shown for three in-
dividual subjects. Neural bs are shown as time courses aligned to the onset of the planning phase cue. Blue shaded box indicates analysis period at the expected
delay of the hemodynamic response.
(C) Neurometric-psychometric comparison across subjects. Behavioral and neural reward bs are plotted for all subjects. Behavioral sensitivity to reward type
matched amygdala sensitivity to reward type (significant with robust fit).
(D) Amygdala planning activity modeled from individuals’ reward preferences predicted BDM bids. We fitted amygdala activity in the planning phase to reward
type, as in (B), and used the resulting model of amygdala planning activity to predict willingness-to-pay bids from the auction-like (BDM) task using linear
regression (robust fit). The plot showsmeans ± SEM for equally populated bins of modeled amygdala activity. This analysis was performed for the 22 subjects for
whom BDM data were available.
See also Figure S5.coupling and interest-dependent ACC-MPFC coupling—were
correlated across subjects (R = 0.45, p = 0.029), which provided
evidence for interacting amygdala-frontal planning activities.
Functional connectivity related to interest rate between ACC
and MPFC was also stronger in individuals with higher average
tendency to save (Figure 4F; performance assessed by saving
index, see Figure 1E) and reflected the extent to which subjects
approximated rate of reward return (Figure S3H). Together, the
relationships to individual differences suggested behavioral rele-
vance for these functional connections. Thus, the formation of
simple economic saving strategies engaged functional circuits
involving the amygdala and distinct frontal areas.
Amygdala-Prefrontal Activities during the Choice Phase
The same amygdala-prefrontal areas continued to signal
saving strategies in the choice phase. Amygdala choice-phase
activity was higher for save compared to spend choices (Fig-
ure S4), tracked subjective reward rate throughout the experi-
ment (Figure S4), and signaled the momentary value of the
current sequence that evolved dynamically over consecutive
save choices (‘‘current sequence value’’; Figures 5A and 5B).
On spend trials, this sequence value signal extended into the
outcome phase (Figure 5B, yellow rectangle), potentially reflect-
ing reward expectation [17, 25]. Notably, sensitivity to value in
the amygdala’s initial planning activity (Figure 2D) did not
match this later outcome-related value signal (across-subjects
correlation of neural betas derived from region-of-interest anal-
ysis; R = 0.06, p = 0.77). This suggested that sequence value
coding in the planning phase did not simply reflect amygdala
reward expectation.
Different from the planning phase, choice-phase amygdala
activity failed to signal the number of saving steps implied
by the current strategy (sequence length). By contrast, the
DLPFC planning signal related to forthcoming sequence length3008 Current Biology 26, 3004–3013, November 21, 2016reoccurred during choices (Figures 5C and 5D), consistent with
DLPFC functions in maintaining task-relevant information [42].
The ACC showed a different, dynamic choice step signal that
reflected the evolving length of the current saving sequence,
increasing with each further save choice (‘‘current sequence
length’’; Figure 5E, GLM4). Such progress monitoring is critical
for the execution of planned behaviors including economic
saving [1–3] and also occurs in monkey ACC neurons during
behavioral sequences [43]. Importantly, ACC progress signals
were distinct from known ACC value signals during decision-
making [30–32], which we observed separately (Figure 5F).
Finally, signals for planned sequence length and current seq-
uence value converged in MPFC (Figures 5G and 5H), which
therefore integrated a maintained sequence length signal with
the sequence’s dynamically evolving value. Thus, during both
planning and sequential choices, amygdala-prefrontal areas en-
coded the planning components sequence value and sequence
length, which were essential (Figure 1F) for guiding subjects’
saving behavior.
As in the planning phase, we observed functional connectiv-
ities between amygdala and prefrontal cortex in the choice
phase (Figure 5I; Table S5; GLM PPI1, 4). Specifically, areas
that jointly encoded the same planning variable were also func-
tionally connected with each other (Figure 5I, magenta). Choice-
dependent coupling (enhanced in save compared to spend
choices) occurred between amygdala andMPFC, reflecting their
common sequence value signals (GLM PPI4). By contrast,
enhanced coupling between ACC and DLPFC during choices
(compared to planning) reflected their common sequence length
signals (GLM PPI1). These distinct functional connections were
linked by a direct, choice-dependent amygdala-ACC connection
(Figure 5I, blue, GLMPPI1). Across subjects, specific connection
strengths in the choice phase correlated with connection
strengths during the planning phase (Figure 5J). These results
N
eu
ra
l β
 (a
.u
.)
r = −0.49
p = 0.01
r = 0.47  
p = 0.02
S
av
in
g 
in
de
x
Amygdala
ACC
MPFC
DLPFC
Sequence lengthA B
C D E F
Planning > choice
Time from cue onset (s)
−3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Planning 
phase
WTS
Sequence
length
−10 0 10 20 30
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Neural β PPI ACC−MPFC
0 1 2 3
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Neural β difference
(WTS − SeqLen)
B
eh
av
io
ra
l 
(S
eq
Le
n 
− 
 W
TS
) 0.7
Figure 4. Frontal Cortex Encoding of Saving Strategies and Planning Connectivity
(A) Activity in DLPFC and ACC was stronger in the planning phase compared to the choice phase (cluster p values corrected for family-wise error across the
whole-brain, p < 0.05; map thresholded at p < 0.005, uncorrected for display purposes, extent thresholdR 10 voxels).
(B) Activity in DLPFC and ACC in the planning phase predicted the length of the forthcoming choice sequence (p < 0.05, whole-brain correction).
(C) Region-of-interest analysis. Planning activity in DLPFC was explained by both reported saving intentions (willingness to save, WTS) and sequence length
(p < 0.05, random-effects multiple linear regression; WTS t(23) = 2.6; sequence length t(23) = 2.32).
(D) Across subjects, DLPFC coding differences between stated (WTS) and executed (sequence length) saving strategies were related to behavioral deviations
from saving intentions (significant with robust fit).
(E) Functional connectivity patterns during the planning phase. PPI analyses revealed correlated activity between amygdala and ACC depending on current
reward type (high-fat > low-fat content; uncorrected at p = 0.005) and between MPFC and ACC depending on current interest rate (high > low interest rate;
p < 0.05, whole-brain correction). Both connectivity patterns were related across subjects (R = 0.46, p = 0.02, significant with robust fit). DLPFC showed stronger
coupling with MPFC during the planning phase compared to the choice phase (blue; p < 0.05, whole-brain correction).
(F) Across subjects, stronger planning connectivity between ACC andMPFCwas related to higher saving performance (significant with robust fit on saving index,
derived from mean sequence lengths).
See also Figures S2 and S5.provided further evidence for functional amygdala-prefrontal cir-
cuits that support both saving strategy formation and execution.
DISCUSSION
Our results suggest that the human amygdala—traditionally
associated with emotional reactions to external events—partic-
ipates in the formation and execution of economic saving strate-
gies toward future rewards. Amygdala planning activity encoded
the two key strategy components that guided subjects’
behavior: the length and value of the planned saving sequence.
Sequence length signals reflected subjects’ internal behavioral
plan by predicting the forthcoming number of saving steps
even before subjects initiated a sequence. Sequence value sig-
nals reflected subjects’ valuations of planned sequences and
predicted economic behavior in a different task on a different
testing day, suggesting a flexible, prospective valuation mecha-
nism. Using a whole-brain imaging technique enabled us to
identify functional networks associated with the formation and
execution of saving strategies. Beyond the amygdala, these net-
works involved specific frontal areas previously implicated in de-
cision-making, which encoded distinct strategy components
and reflected individuals’ saving performance. Taken together,
the identified amygdala-frontal planning activities and their func-
tional interactions represent a potential substrate for linkingfuture-oriented economic valuations to internal saving strategies
and their behavioral execution.
Strategic saving involves the formationof an internal savingplan
motivated by the prospect of future reward, and subsequent plan
execution [1]. The observed two components of neural planning
activity, related to the length and value of the forthcoming saving
sequence, seem to contribute to this process in two ways. First,
sequence length signals in amygdala, DLPFC, and ACC encoded
the abstract behavioral implication of the current saving strategy;
in other words, they signaled the choice of a specific saving plan.
They did not reflect action planning, which was precluded by ran-
domized choice cue positions. During plan execution, these sig-
nals could help to align sequential choices with the current strat-
egy and provide input to well-characterized motor planning
systems in frontal cortex [7] that translate abstract saving inten-
tions into concrete actions. Second, sequence value signals, a
specific component of amygdala planning activity, encoded the
current strategy’s economic value. Although they occurred time-
locked in response to condition cues, they did not reflect general-
ized cue responses, average cue value, or basic reward expecta-
tion. Instead, they conveyed the specific value of the internally
planned sequence. Experimental manipulation of both reward
typeand interest rate ledparticipants toassigndifferent subjective
values to identical sequence lengths, depending on the current
reward-interest combination. This allowed detection of separateCurrent Biology 26, 3004–3013, November 21, 2016 3009
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Figure 5. Planning Signals and Functional Connectivity in the Choice Phase
(A) Amygdala choice-phase activity correlated with current sequence value (p < 0.05, whole-brain corrected).
(B) Amygdala activity reflected the dynamically evolving sequence value during save choices (blue shading; p < 0.05, random-effects multiple linear regression;
t(23) = 2.21; negative bs indicate lower activity with higher value). On spend trials, activity encoded sequence value during the reward phase, likely reflecting
reward expectation (yellow shading; p < 0.05, random-effects multiple linear regression; t(23) = 2.79; positive b following outcome).
(C and D) DLPFC choice-phase activity correlated with planned sequence length (region-of-interest analysis, p < 0.05, random-effects multiple linear regression),
specifically during last save choice (blue shading; t(23) = 2.89) and subsequent spend choice (pink shading; t(23) = 4.74).
(E) ACC choice-phase activity tracked current position in the sequence, i.e., current sequence length (p < 0.05, whole-brain correction).
(F) ACC activity reflected both current sequence length and save-spend value difference (p < 0.05, random-effects multiple linear regression; value difference:
t(23) = 3.91; sequence length: t(23) = 2.24).
(G) MPFC choice-phase activity correlated with planned sequence value (p < 0.05, whole-brain correction).
(H) MPFC activity reflected planned sequence length and current sequence value (p < 0.05, random-effects multiple linear regression; sequence value:
t(23) = 2.08; sequence length: t(23) = 2.12; negative bs indicate lower activity with higher value and longer sequences).
(I) Functional connectivity patterns during the choice phase. PPI analysis (p < 0.05, whole-brain correction) showed correlated choice-dependent activity (save >
spend choice) between amygdala and MPFC and between ACC and DLPFC. Amygdala and ACC had stronger correlated activity during the choice phase
compared to the planning phase (blue).
(J) Amygdala-MPFC choice-phase connectivity across subjects correlated with planning-phase ACC-MPFC connectivity (significant with robust fit).
See also Figure S5.neural signals related to sequence value and length. Sequence
value signals likely reflected the subjective value of a sequence
that integrated both reward value and cost due to temporal delay
and effort, although our experiment was not designed to sepa-
rately test these value components. The amygdala’s sequence
value signal also reflected inter-individual valuation differences
and predicted behavior in the separate auction-like BDM task.
Such prospective, mechanism-independent valuation of behav-
ioral plans seems suited to inform the initial decision to select a
preferred saving strategy and to regulate motivation during sub-
sequent goal pursuit. Encoding of the two planning compo-
nents likelydependedonamygdala-frontal functional interactions,3010 Current Biology 26, 3004–3013, November 21, 2016which reflected current parameters for strategy selection and ex-
plained variation in saving performance.
During execution of subjects’ saving strategies, the amygdala
and functionally coupled MPFC continually evaluated the
current sequence and exhibited choice-dependent functional
coupling. Such dynamic, sequential valuations in amygdala
and MFPC could inform stepwise decision-making according
to an internal saving plan. This interpretation is supported by
previously described valuation activities in amygdala and
MPFC [11, 18–20, 24–26, 28, 30, 31] and the deleterious effects
of damage to either area on value-guided behavior [23, 44].
Given the amygdala’s outputs to autonomic effectors [37], its
sequential valuation could also serve to regulate motivation and
affective state in the pursuit of reward goals.
The DLPFC, an area implicated in cognitive planning [29], was
more active during planning than choice, encoded both the
length of the forthcoming behavioral sequence and subjects’ re-
ported saving intentions, and reflected behavioral deviations
from stated intentions. Unlike the amygdala, DLPFC did not
encode sequence value, which limits its role in prospective
valuation. During the choice phase, DLPFC’s sequence length
signal reoccurred specifically on final save trials, when strategy
completion was imminent, and lasted until the subsequent
spend choice. Although consistent with a general role in planning
and maintaining task goals [41], these results identify previously
unrecognized DLPFC functions in economic saving.
The ACC is implicated in cognitive control during sequential
behaviors [31, 32, 43, 45]. We found that during the choice
phase, a dorsal ACC region tracked the progress of subjects’
internally defined saving strategy. This tracking function re-
flected an internal evaluation, as our task did not offer external
progress cues. It was also not explained by commonly reported,
separately observed ACC value difference signals [31]. Strik-
ingly, during the planning phase, we found prospective ACC ac-
tivity not previously characterized, which reflected subjects’
planned sequence length. This suggests that ACC, together
with functionally coupled amygdala and DLPFC, contributes to
the formation of a saving strategy based on economic valua-
tions. Our main planning variables differ markedly from ACC
value signals observed in sequential foraging tasks, which reflect
the average value of the foraging environment [31]. Planning sig-
nals for sequence length and sequence value specifically re-
flected the planned, forthcoming course of action and thus
seem linked to situations that allow the formation of internal
plans multiple steps in advance, as in economic saving. By
contrast, the choice phase of our saving task shares elements
with foraging. For example, the observed encoding of value dif-
ference between save and spend choices in ACC (Figure 5F) is
consistent with ACC valuation of current and alternative courses
of action [31]. Valuation processes involved in foraging and
exploration decisions, which engage similar brain systems to
those identified here [31, 46], likely play additional roles in eco-
nomic saving.
Previous studies identified frontal-subcortical activities under-
lying cognitive planning [42], model-based learning [13, 14], and
prospective imagination [9], which represent important compo-
nents of reward-guided behavior. Our experiments focused on
economic saving strategies defined by the internal formation of
a subjectively preferred reward goal [1–3] and its behavioral
pursuit through self-defined choices [1]. By modeling both the
formation and execution of saving strategies [1], our experiments
necessarily focused on shorter timescales of up to two minutes.
We suggest that the presently observed planning signals
reflect a basic mechanism engaged by the formation of a behav-
ioral strategy toward future reward. Additional mechanisms
likely mediate planned behavior over longer periods, including
episodic prospection [12], valuation of effort and persistence
[32], and discounting of long-term delayed rewards [10, 11].
The use of primary, liquid rewards to elicit behavioral variation
follows previous neuroimaging [11] and behavioral saving exper-
iments [3]. This, together with manipulation of both reward typeand interest rate, allowed us to identify neural planning signals
related to behaviorally well-characterized subjective valuations.
Although valuations for different reward types typically involve
overlapping neural circuits [47, 48], future studies will have to
confirm planning signals in saving behavior toward abstract,
monetary rewards.
We designed our saving task to capture basic components
of everyday choice scenarios, such as contributions to a
savings account or short-term consumption decisions [1–3].
Such decisions are subject to continuous temptations to
spend or consume accumulated rewards. Similarly, subjects
could internally plan their saving behavior but subsequently
change their mind during sequence execution, as implied by
models of quasi-hyperbolic temporal discounting [11]. Future
studies could adapt our paradigm to investigate relationships
between saving behavior, inter-temporal preferences [10,
11], and individual commitment attitudes. Furthermore, longi-
tudinal designs and real-life savings data could test links
between the presently identified neural mechanisms and indi-
viduals’ financial status.
Classical concepts of amygdala function focus on its immedi-
ate responses to affective cues [35, 36], whereas current views
extend this cue reactivity to complex human behaviors [35, 37,
40]. However, the future-focused economic planning signals
demonstrated here are not anticipated by either classical or cur-
rent concepts. Amygdala planning signals reflected future saving
goals well before they were obtained, persisted over sequential
choices, and differed from separate basic reward expectation
signals following a spend choice. Accordingly, amygdala plan-
ning signals differed from known amygdala processing of exter-
nally cued, immediate rewards [17–20, 40] and decision param-
eters in isolated, single-trial choices [23, 24, 27]. Thus, our data
significantly expand current views by demonstrating amygdala
sensitivity to internal behavioral strategies and their subjective
values.
Interpretation of the present human imaging results is greatly
facilitated by detailed evidence about the functional properties
of single amygdala neurons, available frommonkey experiments
in a similar reward-saving task [15, 16]. With the spatial resolu-
tion of fMRI, we cannot determine whether sequence value
and sequence length signals are separated at single-neuron
level (with a typical fMRI voxel containing as many as 5.5 million
neurons [49]). However, this is a critical issue for understanding
the neural computations involved in selecting a saving strategy.
Our monkey studies show that the primate amygdala indeed
contains separate but anatomically intermingled neurons encod-
ing the value and length of economic choice sequences [15, 16].
The presently observed amygdala signals likely reflect the
activity of these two separate neuronal populations. The loca-
tion of our main effects is consistent with basolateral and cen-
tromedial amygdala, where intermingled sequence value and
sequence length neurons are found in monkeys [15, 16]. The
coexistence of these signals in the same brain system—shown
here for the first time in the human amygdala—might indicate
local conversion from economic valuations to behavioral strate-
gies [15, 16], potentially via competitive, inhibitory interactions
among neighboring neurons. This process most likely involves
frontal areas with known decision functions, which depend on
interactions with amygdala [21, 22].Current Biology 26, 3004–3013, November 21, 2016 3011
Compared to the monkey studies, the present human exper-
iments provide several new insights. The currently reported
planning signals in the human amygdala integrated multiple
factors in the subjective valuation of saving plans, including
interest rate and reward type. The present data also link
amygdala planning activities to a sophisticated, perhaps hu-
man-specific form of economic behavior involving the formula-
tion of bids in an auction-like (BDM) mechanism. Critically,
we demonstrate that the amygdala’s planning activity and
amygdala-frontal connections partly explain inter-individual
differences in saving behavior, which relates to key economic
issues affecting individuals and societies [3]. Using whole-
brain imaging allowed us to uncover functionally connected
systems in frontal cortex beyond amygdala with previously un-
known functions in economic saving. These frontal areas
encode partly distinct planning components and thus repre-
sent interesting targets for future single-neuron recordings.
Notably, the same amygdala-frontal circuits are implicated in
deregulated reward expectation and affective disorders [50],
which impact on the motivation to plan for future rewards
and pursue distant goals. Our experimental approach to the
neurobiology of economic saving could help understand
dysfunctional planning and decision functions of amygdala-
frontal circuits in such conditions.Conclusions
Theories of planned behavior identify a two-stage process that
distinguishes initial plan formation from subsequent execution,
and a valuation component that directs behavioral strategies
toward future rewards. The present data characterize the neu-
ral mechanisms underlying these processes during the forma-
tion and pursuit of simple economic saving strategies. Our
findings suggest an extended view of the human amygdala
that includes a planning function for future rewards embedded
within prefrontal circuits with distinct planning and decision
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